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WHAT FEDERAL RULEMAKERS CAN LEARN FROM  
STATE PROCEDURAL INNOVATIONS 
 
Seymour Moskowitz* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 This conference was convened to discuss ideas and proposals for changing the 
existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).  Change is obviously appropriate in 
light of the ferment in federal civil procedure today.  In particular, the Supreme Court’s 
recent interpretation of standards governing Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) in 
the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 decisions has raised questions 
about access to, and fair processing of, certain claims in the federal courts.3  In addition, 
controversy continues about the cost and use of the discovery process, the appropriate 
use of protective orders and several other issues. 
 The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 marked the culmination 
of the work of a group of procedure experts at least equal to those who have attended 
this conference.4  This “dream team” set out to reimagine civil procedure in the most 
substantial reform in U.S. history.  The newly created FRCP were to ensure the “just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”5   In 1935, 
Judge Clark and Professor Moore also had expressed the hope that the federal rules 
                                            
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law, J.D. Harvard Law School; B.A, Columbia 
University.  I think my colleague Melissa Mundt whose hard work, skill and patience made this article 
possible. 
1  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
2  129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). 
3  See § IID infra. 
4  See, generally, Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 982–91 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, How 
Equity Conquered Common Law]. 
5  FED. R. CIV. P. 1 
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might "properly be a model to all the states"6 and that lawyers practicing in both federal 
and state courts in all jurisdictions would practice under substantially similar rules. 
 More than seventy years later, it is clear those lofty aims have not been achieved.  
Indeed, many of the papers presented at this conference raise substantial doubts about 
whether the contemporary federal rules and their application faithfully implement the 
aspirations of the framers and Rule 1.  Using an even wider lens, it is clear that the 
hoped-for gravitational pull of the FRCP on state procedure has waned considerably.  In 
a 2002 update to his survey on the conformity of state rules of civil procedure to the 
FRCP, Professor Oakley noted “the FRCP have lost credibility as an avatar of 
procedural reform.”7 
 Civil procedure in state courts is important for a number of reasons.  The number of 
cases in state courts dwarfs the federal caseload.8  Millions of individual Americans and 
businesses rely upon the state civil justice system to resolve crucial issues in their lives, 
e.g., personal injuries, family law matters and commercial disputes.  While our common 
law litigation tradition has involved primarily private parties seeking redress for private 
wrongs, courts today are often required to decide questions which transcend the rights 
and obligations of the individual parties.   
 DeToqueville noted in the 1840’s that law, lawyers and the legal system are central 
ingredients in our American democracy.  “Scarcely any political question arises in the 
                                            
6  Charles Clark & James William Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 387 (1935). 
7  John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV L.J. 354, 358 (2002). 
8  More than fourteen million civil cases were filed in general jurisdiction state courts in 2007 and 
another sixty-nine million in limited jurisdiction courts.  National Center for State Courts, Examining the 
Work of State Courts: A National Perspective from the Court Statistics Project (2009), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2007B_files/EWSC-2007-v21-online.pdf (hereinafter “NCSC 
2009”).  In contrast, the number of civil cases filed in federal district courts in 2009 totaled 276,397.  U.S. 
Gov’t Printing Off., Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 2009 Annual Report of the Director, T. 
S-7 (2009). 
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United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.”9  The 
Supreme Court has recognized the “prominence of the States in matters of public health 
and safety.”10  Major public policy issues are routinely decided through civil litigation in 
the United States, many of these in state courts.  Contemporary examples include the 
liability of tobacco companies to smokers and to government for the costs of smoking-
related illnesses,11 damages from Hurricane Katrina,12 the nation-wide scandal of 
abusive Catholic priests,13 and numerous current “front page issues.”14  The public 
nature of this litigation emerges in a variety of contexts: (a) private suits involving 
                                            
9  ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Henry Reeve ed., Vintage Books 1945) (1795). 
10  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996). 
11  See, e.g., CARRICK MOLLENKAMP, ADAM LEVY, JOSEPH MENN & JEFFREY ROTHFEDDER, THE PEOPLE VS. 
BIG TOBACCO: HOW THE STATES TOOK ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS (1998). 
12  See Barbara Landry v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Col, 983 So.2d 66, 83 (La. 2008) (upholding flood 
damage exclusion in insurance policies); State v. All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers Authorized & Licensed to 
do Bus. in the St. of La., 937 So. 2d 313, 330 (La. 2006) (holding that an executive act by the governor 
extending the time frame in which citizens had to file insurance claims was constitutional).  See generally 
La. Supreme Ct., Rules for La. Dist. Cts., available at 
http://www.lasc.org/rules/dist.ct/CDCAppendices.pdf (providing specific procedure and cause number 
types for claims arising out of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and suggesting that the continued number of 
claims in Louisiana courts pertaining to these disasters is still large). 
13  See, e.g., Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 909 A.2d 983, 987 (Conn. Super. 2006) (denying 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on claims alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and 
reckless or wanton misconduct in a suit alleging sexual abuse of minors by priests); Doe v. Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis, 2010 WL 623698, at *3 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) (holding that the First 
Amendment bars tort claims against a religious institution based on its negligent hiring, retention, or 
supervisions of sexually abusive clerics); Tom Hals & Santosh Nadgir, Mediator Named in Delaware 
Catholic Abuse Claims, REUTERS, May 4, 2010,  
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6435K920100504 (discussing the naming of a mediator after a 
Catholic diocese filed for bankruptcy to diffuse the start of civil trials in state court stemming from sexual 
abuse allegations dating to 1950s).  See generally TIMOTHY D.LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE 
(2008). 
14  Pena v. Newell Funding, LLC, No. ESX-C-16-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2010) (order awarding 
attorney’s fees in consumer fraud action against foreclosure-rescue companies).  See, e.g., New Jersey 
Judiciary, Mass Tort – NuvaRing, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/nuvaring/case_list.htm (last 
visited May 17, 2010) (complaints allege birth control method increases risk of blood clots due to the high 
amounts of hormones released; class action includes the death of a woman caused by deep vein 
thrombosis); Laurel Brubaker Calkins & Margaret Cronin Fisk, BP, Transocean Lawsuits Surge as Oil 
Spill Spreads in Gulf, BUSINESSWEEK, available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-01/bp-
transocean-lawsuits-surge-as-oil-spill-spreads-in-gulf.html  (stating that BP and Transocean face at least 
36 state lawsuits arising out of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico).  See Amanda Bronstad, Act I for Toyota:  
State Lawsuits Could Set the Stage for the Automaker’s Federal Mass Tort, THE NAT’L LAW J. (May 3, 
2010), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202457483899 for a discussion of 
this and other state cases. 
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product safety, corporate governance, and other issues of common concern;15 (b) suits 
by or against government or government agencies16 including “private attorney general” 
suits;17 and (c) class actions and other representative actions, which, by definition, 
involve the substantive rights of large groups of people.18 
 Dean Carrington has noted that courts are the American alternative to a bureaucratic 
state: “[t]he superiority of private litigation over the administrative process was 
recognized in the years following 1938, when modern discovery was introduced.”19  The 
need to supplement, or to create greater, remedies than those provided by regulatory 
agencies is widely recognized.  Civil litigation has become an important instrument for 
creating public reforms and for challenging existing institutional practices. 
 Long ago Justice Brandeis praised the ability of states to be laboratories in which 
                                            
15  See products and events described supra nn. ___ and accompanying text. 
16  See e.g. Miller v. Filter, 150 Cal. App. 4th 652, 666 (3d Dist. 2007) (affording immunity to rural 
prosecutors for bringing an action to enforce mine safety regulations); Asbury Park Press v. Lakewood 
Tp. Police Dept., 804 A.2d 1178, 1192 (N.J. Super. L. Div. 2002) (ordering the release of 911 tapes to the 
press regarding a police brutality allegation). 
17  See e.g., Savaglio v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 149 Cal. App. 4th 588 (1st Dist. 2007).  In a case alleging 
that Wal-Mart denied employees meal breaks, the court stated: 
The private attorney general doctrine codified in section 1021.5 “ ‘ “rests upon the 
recognition that privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the 
fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions, and that, 
without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to 
enforce such important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible.” 
Thus, the fundamental objective of the doctrine is to encourage suits enforcing important 
public policies by providing substantial attorney fees to successful litigants in such 
cases.”Id.   
See also State v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 216 (Jan. 25, 2007) (discussing 
private attorney general suits and anti-trust law). 
18  Over the past generation, the Supreme Court has dramatically limited the availability of the federal 
forum for large scale class action suits.  See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974) 
(individual notice to each identifiable class member in FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) actions required; full costs 
to be borne by plaintiffs)  See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 3.501(A)(4) (providing that “[c]lass members have the 
right to intervene in the action, subject to the authority of the court to regulate the orderly course of the 
action”); OHIO CIV. R. 23(E) (providing that a class action suit cannot be dismissed without approval of the 
court and notice of the proposed dismissal to members of the class).  See Nt’l Center for St. Cts., Mass 
Torts: Lessons in Competing Strategies and Unintended Consequences, CIVIL ACTION, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1–2 
(Spring 2003).  Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969) (no aggregation of claims of individual class 
members allowed to satisfy amount in controversy requirement in diversity cases)  “Ninety-eight percent 
of mass tort cases are ultimately resolved in state courts.”  Id. at 1. 
19  Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997). 
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experiments in the law might be conducted.20  Federal rulemakers considering changes 
can learn much from these trial runs.  To that end, this essay focuses on two major 
themes:  the increasing divergence in pretrial rules and processes between state and 
federal rules and why federal law should follow a growing state trend to lift the veil of 
secrecy which has made litigation inaccessible to the public.  Changes in the FRCP can 
help recapture the original vision of federal litigation expressed in Rule 1. 
II. THE GROWING DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE FRCP & STATE PROCEDURE 
A. Customized Rules  
 A fundamental principle of the 1938 procedural revolution was transsubstantive 
rules, i.e., uniform practice in all types of federal civil cases.21  Boldly combining the 
previously separate law and equity systems, the FRCP has remained true to this 
principle.22  While many states initially adopted the federal rules, either totally or in 
substantial part,23 state procedure today often makes sharp differentiations between 
cases defined by subject, amount in question, or other characteristics.  A few examples 
suffice to illustrate.24  In Arizona, medical malpractice cases have their own rules.25  In 
                                            
 20 New St. Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as 
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
21  The Rules Enabling Act prescribes “ general rules of practice and procedure.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(1934).  See generally, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Symposium, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive 
Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244–46 (1989). 
22  Federal Article I courts, of course, have their own rules.  See generally FED R. BANKR. P.; U.S. TAX CT. 
R. PRAC. & P.; R. U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS. 
23  John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coons, The Federal Rules In State Courts: A Survey of State Court 
Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1381 (1986). 
24  This essay is not the venue to exhaustively detail these differences but they are collected in other 
sources.  For example, in volumes 11-16 of Matthew Bender's Forms of Discovery I annually update a 
rule-by-rule comparison between the 50 state rules on discovery and Rules 26–37 of the FRCP.  The 
rules are summarized in charts or presented in full text and are annually compared to the comparable 
federal discovery rules.  See 11 BENDER’S FORMS OF DISCOVERY, app. B (2007) (Comparison of State 
Rules with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 33); Id. at app. C (State Rules Governing 
Discovery at Variance With the Federal Rules); 12 BENDER’S FORMS OF  DISCOVERY, app. E (2007) 
(Comparison of State Rules With Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34); Id. at app. F (State Rules at 
Variance With Federal Rule 34); 13 BENDER’S FORMS OF Discovery, app. H (2007) (Comparison of State 
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New York negligence cases, interrogatories and depositions are mutually exclusive 
except with leave of court.26  Alaska has special discovery rules for domestic relations 
matters27 and in Colorado distinct rules are used in many kinds of cases.28   
 The different nature of the caseload in state courts from that in the federal courts 
partially explains some of this variety of rules.  The scope, cost, and speed of pretrial 
process in state litigation has been debated as vigorously as in the federal courts29  The 
volume and type of allowable discovery in the states are now often differentiated by the 
amount in controversy.  Alaska Rule 26(g), for example, permits only limited discovery 
and requires expedited calendaring for personal injury or property damages cases 
involving less than $100,000.00.30  South Carolina bans physical or mental 
examinations unless the case involves more than $100,000.00.31  Some states bar all 
discovery, except by agreement of parties or leave of court, in particular courts or in 
cases involving less than a stipulated amount.32  Categorizing cases based on the 
amount in controversy is common in a society which values efficiency, but raises 
                                                                                                                                             
Rules With Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 35 & 36); Id. app. I (State Rules at Variance With Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 35 & 36); 14 BENDER’S FORMS OF DISCOVERY, app. K (2007) (Comparison of 
State Rules With Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37 & 45). 
25  ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2 requires exchange of all relevant medical records, exchange of uniform 
interrogatories and a request for production of specified documents prior to the Rule 16(c) comprehensive 
pretrial conference. 
26  N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L&R 3130(1). 
27  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26.1. 
 28 COLO. R. CIV. PRO 16.2. 
29  See generally Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Civil Litigation with Mandatory Disclosure and Voluntary 
Transmission of Private Data, 34 J. Legal Stud. 137 (2005); Richard P. Holme, Just, Speedy and 
Inexpensive: Possible Simplified Procedure for Cases Under $100,000, 29 COLO. LAW. 5 (2000); Hon. 
Robert D. Myers, MAD Track: An Experiment in Terror, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11, 13 (1993) (discussing the 
conclusion of an Arizona committee that greatest cause of inefficiency in the state civil process was delay 
and excessive cost created by lawyers in the discovery process). 
 30 ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(g). 
31  S.C. R. CIV. P. 35(a).  In addition depositions in cases under $10,000.00 and interrogatories in cases 
under $25,000.00 and are prohibited.  Id. 
 32 E.g., MICH. CT. R. 2.302(A)(2) (providing that in District Court no discovery is permitted). MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 600.8301 (West 2010) (Michigan District Courts have exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions 
when the amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000.00).  In Utah, no discovery is allowed in 
contract cases of less than $20,000.00 and in other specified cases.  UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(2)(2)(A). 
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questions of fairness to litigants with smaller claims.33   
 A number of states that formerly followed the FRCP closely have experimented with 
even more comprehensive innovations.  In January, 1999 new Texas rules became 
effective.34  The changes were to reduce “costs, delays and misuse” associated with the 
existing pretrial practice.35  Texas Rule 190 divides cases into categories and requires 
“discovery control plans” in each category.36  “Level 1” cases involve claims for 
monetary relief of $50,000 or less. 37  Discovery is limited severely in these cases.38  In 
“Level 2,” parties use the pre-existing Texas Discovery Rules but with specified 
restrictions.39  Discovery in Level 3 cases (complex cases that do not fit Levels 1 and 2) 
is individually managed by the court which has wide latitude in overseeing the pretrial 
phase.40   
 Colorado was the second state in the country to adopt the Federal Rules as its own 
state rules in 194141 but it has now created procedure distinct from the FRCP.  
Mandatory disclosure and explicit limits on traditional discovery were the central themes 
                                            
33  See generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules, 84 Geo. 
L.J. 61 (1995). 
 34 TEX. R. CIV. P. 190-215. 
 35 Explanatory Statement Accompanying the 1999 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure 
Governing Discovery, Order of Aug. 5, 1998. 
 36 TEX. R. CIV. P. § 190.1 (cmt. 1 to 1999 changes). 
 37 Id.. § 190.2 (cmt. 1 to 1999 changes).  Divorces not involving children where the value of the marital 
estate is less than $50,000.  Id. § 190.2(a) cmt. 2 to 1999 changes. 
 38 For example, each party is restricted to six hours of oral depositions.  Id. § 190.2(c)(2).  
Interrogatories may not exceed twenty-five.  Id. § 190.2(c)(3) and all other limitations set by other rules 
apply.  Id. § 190.2. 
 39 Id. § 190.3(b)(3).  Interrogatories are limited to twenty-five.  Id.  An aggregate limit of fifty hours is 
imposed on each side for depositions of parties.  Id.  § 190.3(b)(2).   
40  Id. § 190.4, 4(a).  In a pretrial scheduling order, the trial judge determines the discovery period, 
limitations on the amount of discovery, deadlines for pleading, and any other matters that may be 
addressed under Rule 166(a).  Id. § 190.4(b). Requests for Disclosure by which a party may obtain basic 
discoverable information bar objections based on work product or unnecessary expense.  Id. § 192.4 
(cmt. 1 to 1999 changes).  Failure to fully disclose is an abuse of the discovery process.  Id. § 194 (cmt. 1 
to 1999 changes). 
 41 John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coons, The Federal Rules In State Courts, 61 WASH L. REV. 1367, 1384 
(1986). 
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of the 1995 amendments to the Colorado rules.  A party may take only one deposition of 
each adverse party and of two other persons.42  Other discovery devices are similarly 
prescribed.43  Colorado Rule 26.3 provides special procedures for disclosure, alternate 
dispute resolution, discovery and trial procedures for civil actions in which the claimant 
seeks monetary damages under $50,000.44  Colorado Rule 37, the sanctions provision, 
was amended to include the new disclosure procedures as well as the discovery 
process.45  Failure to disclose bars presentation of that evidence unless the failure is 
harmless.46   
 A third provocative reform differentiating state procedural rules from the FRCP is the 
use of court created, rather than lawyer initiated, discovery.  In this area, state courts 
have begun to reflect a more civil law concept of litigation in which the judge, rather than 
the parties, is in charge of collecting and organizing evidence.47  Arizona has standard 
interrogatories for personal injury, including wrongful death, and contract actions.48  
Connecticut uses form interrogatories in actions arising from the operation or ownership 
of a motor vehicle or the ownership, maintenance, or control of real property.49  
California50New Jersey,51 Colorado,52 Florida,53 Maryland,54 and South Carolina55  
                                            
 42 COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(A). 
 43 Id. § 26(b)(2)(B).  Only twenty interrogatories, requests for production and requests for admissions 
are permitted.  Id. § 26(b)(2)(D), 26(b)(2)(E). 
 44 Id. § 26.3.  In 2004, special “Simplified Rules” were instituted for civil cases seeking damages of less 
than $100,000. 
 45 Id. § 37(a), 37(a)(2)(A). 
46 Id. 37(c)(1).  Reasonable expenses and attorneys fees are available when one party has failed to 
produce the required information.  Id.  
 47 See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 
299 (2002). 
 48 ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1; see e.g. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. FORM 4A/4. 
 49 ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1.  See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. FORM 4A/4. 
50  See e.g. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2030(c), 2033.5. 
 51 See N.J. CN. PRAC. R. 4:17-1(h)(i); N.J. COURT RULES APP. II. 
 52 COLO. R. CIV. P. 33(e); COLO. R. CIV. P. FORMS 20 (providing uniform interrogatories); Id. § 21.2 
(providing uniform Requests for Production in domestic relations matters) 
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likewise encourage or require the use of pattern discovery, i.e., standard interrogatories, 
requests for production and requests for admission, in specific types of cases.56    
 Powerful incentives are employed to encourage the use of court-initiated forms, a 
reflection of the desire to make the pretrial process more economical and efficient.  
Many states now impose numerical limits on interrogatories, requests for admission and 
other discovery.  Interrogatories initiated by parties count each subpart as a single 
interrogatory; court created interrogatories, however, even containing subparts are 
counted as one. 57  Parties in many state courts are now deemed to have been served 
automatically with applicable form interrogatories or other requests for information 
without request by the opposing party.58   
B. Specialty Courts and Dockets 
 Dissatisfaction with the delays and costs of litigation have often been expressed 
about casehandling in the federal courts.  State courts have moved nimbly and 
aggressively to meet these problems.  The creation of specialty courts, staffed with 
chosen judges and deploying innovative and differential case management, is another 
important experiment underway in the states.  These courts, variously called Business 
Courts, Complex Litigation Dockets, or similar titles, have been created to deal with a 
small subset of the total state caseload.  They owe their genesis to judicial initiatives, 
after careful investigation of problems, rather than to legislative mandates. 
                                                                                                                                             
 53 See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.340(a) (requiring that “if the supreme court has form interrogatories for the type 
of action, the initial interrogatories shall be in the form approved by the court”). 
 54 See MD. R. CIV. P. 2-421(a) (counting court "form" interrogatories only as a single interrogatory). 
 55 See S.C. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(i)–(b)(7) (setting out standard form interrogatories to be used) 
 56 See UTAH R. CIV. P. FORMS 18, 29, 20. 
 57 See e.g. MD. R. CIV. P. 2-421(a). 
 58 New Jersey utilizes pattern interrogatories in this manner.  After a case is filed, the parties must 
automatically respond to the court-created discovery without service of any paper.  N.J. CIV. PRAC. R. 
4:17-1(b)(2).  See also, CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 13-6 (allows service of Notice of Interrogatories in lieu of 
actually serving the interrogatories set forth in the forms); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 13-8(a) (provides no 
objection may be filed with respect to interrogatories set forth in the form). 
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 At least nine states have courts of this general description.  These tribunals 
administer and decide commercial litigation often involving large dollar amounts, issues 
of corporate governance, banking law or securities, technology issues and similar 
matters.  Judges utilize continuous case management over matters which need special 
oversight, particularly discovery matters, motion practice, and special proceedings.  
Expedited rulings on motions and firm dates for trial are characteristic.  An additional 
common objective is the development a consistent body of precedent in these topics. 
 Connecticut may serve as a prototypical example for these courts.  The Complex 
Litigation Docket (CLD) was established to cope with cases involving multiple litigants, 
legally intricate issues, or claims for damages that could total millions of dollars.59  
These cases benefit from individualized judicial oversight, most particularly in discovery.  
While there are no set rules for inclusion on the CLD, the following cases have often 
been found to be appropriate; mass torts, construction contracts, corporate governance, 
dissolution or transfer of control of business entities, Uniform Commercial Code, 
securities, and others.60 
 Courts in other states display similar innovations.  In Florida, the Complex Business 
Litigation Courts were created by judges to handle cases involving antitrust, intellectual 
property cases, franchise, and unfair competition matters.61  Strict limits are imposed 
upon traditional discovery methods.  In Georgia, the Business Court determines actions 
in which the amount in controversy exceeds $1,000,000 and which are brought 
pursuant to state statutes governing securities, commercial relations, corporations and 
                                            
59  State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, Facts About the Connecticut Judicial Branch Complex Litigation 
Docket, http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/super/facts.pdf (last visited May 20, 2010). 
60  Id. 
61  Florida Business Courts, About the Florida Business Courts, http://flabuscourts.org/ (last visited May 
20, 2010). 
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related topics.62 
 Expedited procedure is a striking feature of these specialty courts.  In Ohio, judges 
must decide all motions in commercial cases within sixty days of their filing; cases must 
be  resolved within eighteen months.63  Maryland judges are specially trained in 
business and technology.  Cases are assigned different tracks at an initial scheduling 
conference.  An expedited track requires trial within seven months from the date of filing 
of defendant’s responsive pleading while a second track brings cases to trial within 
twelve months.64 
 A number of authors have discussed whether these Business/Complex Litigation 
Courts receive a disproportionate amount of resources and attention thereby 
disadvantaging smaller cases.65  While these cases do consume considerable judicial 
and administrative resources, these suits would be in the legal system regardless of 
venue.  Efficiency, consistency, and lower costs may well counsel special treatment for 
this class of cases. 
C. Swords to Ploughshares:  Mandatory Disclosure in State Courts 
 "Where the object always is to beat every ploughshare into a sword, the 
discovery procedure is employed variously as weaponry."66   
 
                                            
62  Fulton Superior Court, Rule 1004-Amended Business Case Division, available at 
http://sca.fultoncourt.org/superiorcourt/pdf/business_court.pdf. 
63 Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Court News, 
http://www.fccourts.org/gen/WebFront.nsf/wp/56A54A2DE9D04EB38525752000720CF8?opendocumen 
(last visited May 20, 2010). 
64  Maryland Courts, Maryland Business and Technology Case Management Program (2001), available 
at http://courts.state.md.us/b&t-ccfinal.pdf. 
65  See Mitchell L. Bach, Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation and Jurisdiction of Business Courts 
in the Last Decade, 60 Bus. Law. 147, 211 (2004) (discussing how the cases in business courts may 
generally take more resources, but are still a more efficient use of resources); Ember Reichgott Junge, 
Business Courts:  Efficient Justice or Two-Tiered Elitism?, 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 315, 318–19 (1998). 
66  MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 18 (1980). 
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 Mandatory disclosure of specified information by the parties in state courts is now 
common.67  Although the FRCP also require some mandatory disclosure,68 state rules 
are often significantly more demanding in an attempt to limit or eliminate the “litigation 
within litigation” which often characterizes formal discovery.  The underlying rationale is 
to mandate cooperation during the pretrial period and to restrict overt conflict between 
parties to its appropriate venue–the trial.  A number of recent state rule changes 
illustrate this movement.  
 In Arizona, a wide range of information must be disclosed by each party within 40 
days of a responsive pleading.69  Former Arizona Justice Zlaket, the architect of the new 
rules, has written 
[A]t the outset of a case the parties must make a full, mutual and 
simultaneous disclosure of all relevant information known by or available to 
them and their lawyers.  In other words no more 'hide the pea'.  No longer will 
it be advantageous to play games of semantics ("If he'd have just asked the 
right question…).  Hopefully, Rule 26.1 will eliminate the need for extensive 
discovery in most cases…70 
 
Relevant documents and electronically stored information must be exchanged together 
with a list of all materials withheld and the reasons for nonproduction.71  None of this is 
required in federal court.  Failure to produce is enforced by sanctions based on a 
                                            
 67 See e.g. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(a); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a); ILL. S. CT. R. 222(d); UTAH R. CIV. P. 
26(a)(1). 
68  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a). 
69  ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(c).  Prior to adopting the disclosure-discovery changes statewide, Arizona tested 
the proposed rules in a single county.  Hon. Robert D. Myers, MAD Track: An Experiment in Terror, 25 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11, 13 (1993).  The demonstration showed that cases using the new procedures terminated 
almost two months earlier on average than cases using traditional discovery methods, and depositions 
and other discovery devices were used far less.  Id.  Attorneys who handled cases under the new system 
commented that disclosure significantly reduced the amount of time needed to exchange information for 
appropriate resolution of cases.  Id. at 23.  
70  Thomas A. Zlaket, Encouraging Litigators to be Lawyers:  Arizona’s New Civil Rules, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1, 5 (1993). 
 
71  ARCP 26.1, Prompt Disclosure of Information. 
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“disclose it or lose it” philosophy; any information not timely disclosed is barred from trial 
except by leave of court for good cause shown.72   
 In Illinois mandatory disclosure requirements and strict limitations on discovery are 
imposed in civil actions seeking money damages under $50,000.73  If a judgment is 
rendered in excess of that amount, a post-trial reduction of the judgment is required.74  
Disclosure of information and documents is mandatory within 120 days after the filing of 
a responsive pleading and occurs automatically; no request is needed.75  
 Mandatory disclosure, expedited procedure and explicit limits on traditional 
discovery are also the central themes of contemporary Colorado rules.76  Once a case 
is at issue counsel must confer within 15 days, transmit all mandatory disclosure within 
30 days, and submit a proposed case management order within 45 days.77  Another 
innovation is that attorneys must advise clients of the estimated costs and fees of 
conducting discovery.78 Clients are thus better informed consumers of legal services 
and may better calculate the costs and benefits of litigating their claim. 
 In addition, Simplified Rules in Colorado for cases involving less than $100,000 
substitute required mutual exchange of information within thirty days for almost all 
traditional discovery rights.79  In employment cases, for example, plaintiffs must provide 
prior employment history documentation, demonstrate efforts to find work, and sign 
                                            
72  ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(c). Rule 26.1(c) was deleted in 1996 but a modified rule was incorporated into 
Rule 37(c)(i).  See Id. at cmt. 1 to 1996 amends. 
73  ILL. S. CT. R. 222. 
74  ILL. S. CT. R. 222(b). 
75  ILL. S. CT. R. 222(c).  
76  COLO. R. CIV. P. 16(b). 
77  Id. 
78  COLO. R. CIV. P. 16(B)(1)(IV). 
79  In place of traditional discovery, these  rules provide for disclosure of witnesses or persons likely to 
have discoverable information, relevant documents, data compilation and tangible things, a computation 
of damages claimed, and insurance policies concerning "disputed facts alleged with particularity in the 
pleading."COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. 1.1(c)(1); COLO R. CIV. P. 26(a). 
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waivers allowing access to their prior personnel files.80  The defendant must produce 
the plaintiff's personnel file.81  A refusal to provide the requested information or an 
incomplete response is subject to sanction.82 
 Those choosing to use this Colorado pretrial system receive early trial settings and 
speedy adjudications.  The Simplified Rules offer an alternative to current problems 
including failure to distinguish between major, complicated disputes and those that 
might be tried effectively with little or no pretrial discovery, high cost, and slow 
processing of cases.  The simplified procedure is designed to dramatically reduce the 
flow of paper, meetings, time and expense of our existing system.     
 These state processes forcing information exchange improve pretrial process.83  
Traditional discovery is often brass knuckled conflict, conducted largely without a 
referee.  Each request for information is treated as narrowly as possible and every claim 
of privilege or irrelevance asserted as broadly as possible.84 
The general principle guiding discovery requests for documents is that 
defense counsel may not flatly lie or hide documents, but they are entitled 
to be "aggressive," making the plaintiff's lawyer "work for what he wants," 
and withhold from relieving the plaintiff's lawyer of the burden of preparing 
his own case.85 
 
                                            
80  COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. 1.1(c)(1)(B)(II). 
81  COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. 1.1(c)(1). 
82  COLO. R. SIMPLIFIED P. 1.1(c)(1)(B)(iii). The Colorado rules provide a variety of remedies for 
improperly withholding information in pretrial procedures: precluding evidence at trial that was not 
disclosed; requiring payment of expenses, including attorneys fees caused by the failure to disclose; 
judicially designating facts as being established for purposes of the litigation; striking all or parts of the 
resisting party's pleadings; and even entering default judgment for failure to comply with pretrial 
obligations. COLO. R. CIV. P. 37(c).  Additional specific information and documentation that a party 
believes should be disclosed may be demanded.  Rule 1.1(c)(1)(B)(iii).   
83  FED. R. CIV. P. 1 and state analogues, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 1. 
84  See generally Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large Firm Litigators: Preliminary 
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709 (1998) 
85  Id. at 712. 
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In this environment, counsel use the pretrial process to maximize information 
gathering and admissions from the opponent, while at the same time resisting 
sharing information with the adversary.86   
 Providing information to an opponent is substantively and psychologically 
difficult in our existing system.  Traditionally, the lawyer’s duty is zealous 
representation of her client’s interests.87  Recently, there is no ethical obligation 
to ensure that all relevant information is made known.  But many state procedural 
rules now are unequivocal in requiring counsel and their clients to disclose even 
information that may prove harmful to their own interests.  My hope is that the 
disclosure rules in Arizona, Illinois, Colorado, and other states will eventually lead 
to an ethical duty to the court on attorneys to seek a full presentation of all facts.  
Rule 3.4(a) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides "a lawyer 
shall not: (a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence."88  Legal 
disputes should be resolved by what the facts reveal rather than what is 
concealed.  As the Supreme Court has noted “[m]utual knowledge of all the 
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”89  Clients’ 
                                            
86  See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK L. REV. 263, 264 (992) 
(concluding that discovery can be used to impose costs on opponents and avoid adverse decision); 
Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Adversarial Dilemma of Civil Discovery, 32 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 17 
(1988) at 18–19 (opining that discovery "gives impetus and opportunity to the baser litigational instincts of 
delay, deception, and unbridled confrontational advocacy"). 
87  ABA MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.4 (cmt. 2). See, e.g., Colin Campbell & John Rea, Civil Litigation 
and the Ethics of Mandatory Disclosure: Moving Toward Brady v. Maryland, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237 (1993). 
88  ABA MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.4(a).  The alleged "unlawfulness" would be a the violation of the 
disclosure requirement.   Rule 3.4(d) likewise imposes a duty of fairness to opposing party and counsel.  
Id. § 3.4(d).  Since lawyers are also under a duty to comply with prevailing rules of procedure, Rule 3.4(d) 
might also be said to be a specific application of Rule 3.4(c), Obedience to Rules of a Tribunal.  See Id. 
89  Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); see also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 
U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958) (discovery together with fair trial procedures “make trial less a game of blind 
man's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable 
extent.”) (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501). 
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interests would be as zealously protected under a cooperative pretrial regime as 
under our current practice. 
D. Access to Courts and Motions to Dismiss 
 The adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938 provided powerful weapons to the 
litigation campaigns for civil rights which characterized the mid-twentieth century.90  
Charles Clark, former President of the Association of American Law Schools and the 
drafter of the Federal Rules was fond of quoting Frankfurter:  “[n]ew winds are blowing 
on the old doctrines, the critical spirit infiltrates traditional formulas . . .”91  The Federal 
Rules simplified pleading,92 expanded joinder of parties and claims, and emphasized 
ease of litigation rather than technical legal pleadings.93  Notice pleading was 
undergirded by liberal discovery. 
 In the 1930s and 1940s the Supreme Court began to respond to test case litigation 
by African Americans which, step by step, ultimately dismantled de jure segregation.94  
In 1957, the link between the burgeoning substantive doctrine of civil rights equality and 
the pleading regime was explicitly recognized in Conley v. Gibson95.  Thirteen years 
earlier, in Steele v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co.,96 the Supreme Court had held 
that black employees possess statutory rights under collective bargaining laws.  The 
                                            
90  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 768–69 (2009). 
91  Charles Clark, What Now?, Address of the President of the Association of American Law Schools at 
the 31st Annual Meeting (December 28-30, 1933), in 20 A.B.A J. 431, 432 (1934) (quoting Felix 
Frankfurther, The Early Writings of O.W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1931)). 
92  FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
93  FED, R. CIV. P. 13, 14, 18–24; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:  The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV 908, 982–91 (1987). 
94  In Missouri Ex Rel. Gains v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, (1938)  the Supreme Court held that it was 
unconstitutional to deny blacks admittance to a state law school because the state disparately offered 
opportunities for law study on the grounds of color.  It repeatedly struck down discriminatory practices on 
the basis of the lack of substantial equality in educational opportunities, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 
629 (1950).  The High Court soon moved on to declare that separate could never be equal in Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
95  355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
96  323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
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statutory grant of exclusive representation by a Union implied a corresponding duty to 
represent minority employees “fairly, impartially and in good faith”.97   
 In Conley, black railway workers sued their Union alleging that their racially 
segregated local union had been denied representation equal to that afforded white 
employees.  In particular, plaintiffs alleged that the union refused to represent their 
interests when the railway abolished 45 jobs held by African-American employees and 
then immediately rehired white employees and some of the previously fired African-
American employees with lesser seniority.  The complaint contained general allegations 
about a discriminatory plan to disadvantage black workers,98   
 The district court dismissed the complaint and the appellate court affirmed,99 but the 
Supreme Court reversed.  A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”100  Plaintiffs’ allegations, albeit 
general, could establish a potential breach of the Union’s statutory duty.101  “[T]he 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts 
upon which he bases his claim.”102  Rule 8 requires only a short and plain statement 
giving defendant “fair notice of plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests.”103  
                                            
97  323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).  See generally Deborah C. Malamud, The Story of Steele v. Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad: White Unions, Black Unions and the Struggle for Racial Justice on the Rails, in LABOR 
LAW STORIES (Laura J. Cooper and Katherine L. Fisk, eds., 2005).  Professor Malamud unearths the 
interconnectedness between Steele and other “racial discrimination” cases also appearing on the 
Supreme Court’s docket at that time.  Noteable among these were the well-known Japanese internment 
cases Hirabayashi v. U.S. and Koramatsu v.U.S..  320 U.S. 81 (1943), 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  Id. at 82–83.  
Professor Malamud notes that a second round of voting had to occur in Steele and a companion case 
regarding certiorari.   Malamud, at 82–84. 
98  Conley, 355 U.S. at 43–44. 
99  Id. at 45–46. 
100  Id. at 45-46. 
101  Id. at 46. 
102  Id.  
103  Id. 
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Simplified notice pleading, established in Conley, was based upon the liberal 
opportunity for subsequent discovery and other pretrial procedures “which enable 
plaintiffs to later disclose more precisely the basis of the claim and defense and define 
more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.”104 
 For a half century Conley was recognized as the definitive federal statement on 
pleading.  It was cited more than 34,000 times by federal courts between 1957 and 
2007.105  In addition to formidable precedential value, the reasons for its strength and 
longevity included a historic commitment to enforcement of civil rights by the federal 
courts106 and the very practical recognition that information available to potential 
plaintiffs before discovery is often limited.  The Supreme Court has often acknowledged 
these information asymmetries.107 
 Fast forward now fifty years to a procedural counterrevolution in a very different legal 
and political climate.  The radical nature and implications of the new standards for 
deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions enunciated in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly108 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal109 become clear by reference to this history.  Iqbal, in particular, 
specifically declared that it was “time to inter Conley.”110  Together, the two cases 
require a district court to engage in a two step inquiry.  First, factual allegations must be 
                                            
104  Id. at 47-48. 
105  Westlaw, Conley v. Gibson Citing References, http://westlaw.com (consulted May 19, 2010) (limited 
by jurisdiction, date, and document type). 
106  See e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).  See also U.S. v. Barnett, 
346 F.2d 99, 108 (C.A. 5 1965).  “What cannot be overestimated, however, in a short-run or long-run 
solution, is the importance of federal courts’ standing fast in protecting federal guaranteed rights of 
individuals.   
107  See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (noting in a race 
discrimination case that “[t]here will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental 
processes”); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 233 (1911) (“As the intent is the design, purpose, resolve, 
or determination in the mind of the accused, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence, but must be 
ascertained by means of inferences from facts and circumstances developed by the proof.”). 
108  550 U.S. 544 (2007).   
109  29 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).   
110  Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1940. 
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separated from legal conclusions; only the former are to be accepted for purposes of 
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.111  Second, the judge must decide whether a “plausible” claim 
for relief has been shown.  This determination is to be made on the basis of “judicial 
experience and common sense.”112 
 The upshot is that is a complaint must now plead facts and even some evidence 
giving a “particularized mention of the factual circumstances of each element of the 
claim.”113  The burden on claimants alleging causes of action based on intent or motive 
is evident, particularly before discovery is available and in situations where defendants 
are solely in control of the facts.  Access to the federal courts and protection of civil 
rights will inevitably be limited. 
 Empirical studies of dispositions of Rule 12(b)(6) motions since Twombly-Iqbal in 
substantive areas where important national nondiscrimination policies are at stake have 
already demonstrated the disparate impact of these new pleading standards.  
Successful defendants’ motions to dismiss in Title VII cases rose from 42% under the 
Conley standard to 54% under Twombly, to 63% under Iqbal.114  Similar results have 
already been reported in disability cases.115.  Reviewing employment discrimination 
cases, issued one year prior and six to twelve months after Twombly, Professor Seiner 
established that motions to dismiss, granted in whole or in part, increased from an 
                                            
111  Id. 
112  Id. at 1950. 
113  Id. at 1953–54. 
114  Patricia Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading:  Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 Am. U. L. 
Rev.553 (2010) (studying two year periods before and after Twombly and the period after Iqbal).   
115  Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 117 (2010). 
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already high 75.4 percent to 80.9 percent.116  A review of the caselaw indicates that 
district courts switched quickly from Conley to Twombly.117 
 I believe when additional research is done we will see similar or even dramatically 
higher rates of dismissal.  The casualties will include cases involving products liability, 
and suits where intent is often determinative and circumstantial evidence of defendant’s 
state of mind is available only after discovery.  The latter category includes 
constitutional and civil rights cases, excessive use of force by police and a host of 
others.118 
 The federal rules offer little opportunity for plaintiffs to extricate themselves from this 
procedural Catch 22.  FRCP 27 provides an extraordinarily limited opportunity for 
parties, before filing a complaint, “to perpetuate testimony regarding any matter that 
may be cognizable in any court of the United States” by oral or written deposition “to 
prevent a failure or delay of justice.”119  This limited opportunity is in no way equivalent 
                                            
116  Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L.REV. 1011, 1027–29 (2009). 
117  Since 2007, Twombly has been cited to 27,938 times by the federal courts. Westlaw, Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly Citing References, http://westlaw.com (consulted May 20, 2010) (limited by jurisdiction, 
date, and document type).  The federal courts have cited to Iqbal 8,900 times since the Court handed 
down its decision in that case. Westlaw, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Citing References, http://westlaw.com 
(consulted May 20, 2010) (limited by jurisdiction, date, and document type). 
118  For examples of federal court reaction to Twombly and Iqbal, see, e.g., Sheehy v. Brown, 2009 WL 
1762856 (2d Cir. 2009) (slip op.) § § 1983 and 1985 claims); Lopez v. Beard, 2009 WL 1705674 (3d Cir. 
2009) (slip op.) (First, Eighth, Fourteenth Amendments, and Age Discrimination Act claims); Morgan v. 
Huber, 2009 WL 1884605 (5th Cir. 2009) (slip op.) (Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim); 
Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009) (First Amendment viewpoint discrimination 
claims); Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009) (employment standards).  Several 
courts have acknowledged that complaints that would have survived under Conley do not do so under 
Twombly-Iqbal.  See, e.g., Kyle v. Holinka, 2009 WL 1867671, at *1 (W.D. Wis. 2009); Coleman v. Tulsa 
County Board of County Comm’rs, 2009 WL 2513520, at *1 (N.D. Okl. 2009).  See,generally, Michael 
Hoenig, Heightened Pleading Standards Taking Effect in Products Cases, 242 N.Y.L,J 3 (2009); 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice:  The Disparate Impact on 
Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U.PA L. REV. 517 (2010). 
119  FED. R. CIV. P. 27 (a)(1)(3).  See Deiulemar Compagnia Di Navigazione v. M/V Allegra, 198 F.3d 472, 
485 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Ash v. Cort, 512 F.2d 909, 911–12 (3d Cir. 1975) (“Rule 27 properly applies 
only in that special category of cases where it is necessary to prevent testimony from being lost . . . Rule 
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to the access to information provided under Rules 26–37.  It applies only to situations 
where testimony might be lost to a prospective litigant unless taken prior to 
commencement of suit.120 
 State courts provide far more promising opportunities for plaintiffs in these 
asymmetrical information situations.  Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202, providing that 
a person “may petition the court for an order authorizing the taking of a deposition . . .  
(b) to investigate a potential claim or suit,” is directly contrary to the federal practice.121  
The rule allows parties, particularly would-be plaintiffs, an opportunity to comply with 
heightened “fact-based” pleading requirements and other certification requirements 
whenever fairness outweighs the burden of the requested discovery.122  The available 
evidence reported by Professor Hoffman indicates that more than half of lawyers 
surveyed in two of Texas’ largest counties had experience either serving and/or 
receiving notice of a pre-suit deposition.123  Of eighty-three judges surveyed, 58% 
reported requests for a Rule 202 presuit deposition at least once.124  Among lawyer 
respondents who initiated Rule 202 petitions, a majority reported the action was taken 
to ensure that the case they sought to file would be valid under the Texas rules.125  
When a judge denied a request for presuit deposition, 83% of lawyers reported they did 
not file a suit.126   
                                                                                                                                             
27 is not a substitute for discovery.  It is available in special circumstances to preserve testimony which 
could otherwise be lost.”) 
120  8 A. Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Richard L. Marcus, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, section 207.1(3rd Ed. 2010). 
121  TEX. R. CIV. P.. 202-1(b). 
122  TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1, 202.4 
123  Lonnie Shrinekopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice:  The Role of Pre-suit 
Investigatory Discovery, 40 U.MICH. J.L. REF. 217, 251 (2007). 
124  Id. at 252. 
125  Id. at 255. 
126  Id. 
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 Professor Hoffman interprets these results as a recognition that if a petition for a 
presuit deposition is denied, there is little possibility for successful litigation.127  This 
result obviously benefits all parties-potential plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts.  
Since 70% of all lawyer respondents reported that the request was granted, aimless 
“fishing” is clearly not the effect of this procedure.128  Presuit discovery is used primarily 
to evaluate the factual elements in the case, i.e., liability, damages, and other relevant 
concerns pre-suit, including the financial solvency of potential defendants.129   
 A number of other state procedural rules follow the Texas model, in contrast to 
Federal Rule 27.  Alabama allows presuit discovery “regarding any matter that may be 
cognizable in any court of this state.”130  Parties may thus use this procedure to search 
for information relevant to their claims, albeit only after judicial permission.131  Similarly, 
Ohio similarly allows a potential plaintiff to “file a petition to obtain discovery,”132 to 
provide the information needed to determine whether a valid cause of action exists.133  
New York134 and other states provide somewhat similar opportunities when the equities 
in a given situation dictate. 
E. State Court Nonacquiescence to Twombly-Iqbal 
 The holdings and implications of the Supreme Court’s new federal pleading 
standards were exhaustively discussed in many of the papers presented at this 
                                            
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 258. 
129  Id. at 268. 
130  Ala R. Civ. P. 27. 
131  Driskill v. Culliver, 797 So. 2d 495, 497–98 (Ala Civ. App. 2001)(permitting pre-suit investigation “to 
determine whether plaintiff has a reasonable basis for filing an action”). 
132  Ohio Civ. R. 34(D)(1). 
133  See, e.g., Benner v. Walker Ambulance Co., 692 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)). 
134  NY.C.P.L.R. § 3102(c) (McKinney 2005). 
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conference and in the legal literature.135  States are, of course, free to develop their own 
procedural rules within constitutional limits.  Another dramatic example of the separation 
of state from federal procedure is the general rejection by state appellate courts of 
Twombly-Iqbal.  To date, nine state appellate courts have discussed or ruled on the 
issue; only two have followed the Supreme Court’s lead.   
 Some courts have specifically rejected Twombly-Iqbal;136  others, especially before 
Iqbal was decided, confined Twombly to its particular factual setting.137  A large number 
have noted that they would continue to follow previously controlling state precedent until 
their state supreme court ruled on the issue.138  Two state courts have expressly 
adopted the new federal standard.  In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
because it previously relied on Conley it would now utilize the new federal pleading 
                                            
135  A large corpus of academic writing has been generated by Twombly-Iqbal,  See, e.g., Robert G. 
Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revised and Revised:  a Comment on Ashcroft & Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 849 (2010); Kevin Clermont & Stephen Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabalizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 821 (2010); Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525642; Edward A. Harnett, Taming Twombly, Even after Iqbal, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2009). 
136  See, e.g., Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 955 A.2d 1082, 1087 n.1 (Vt. 2008) (rejecting Twombly because 
federal jurisprudence does not affect state procedural rules); In re Flood Litigation Coal River Watershed, 
668 S.E.2d 203, 261 (W. Va. 2008) (relying on state law); see also Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 
P.3d 344 (Ariz. 2008) (stating that Twombly didn’t change how Arizona interprets its own rule); Indiana v. 
American Family Voices, Inc., 898 N.E.2d 293, 296 n.1 (Ind. 2008) (choosing to rely on Indiana 
precedent); Peak Alarm Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., No. 20080918, 2010 WL 1507942 (Utah Apr. 16, 
2010) (stating that citation to Twombly does not indicate adoption, but § 1983 doesn’t require heightened 
pleading);  Stonebridge Equip. Leasing, LLC, No. PB09-1677, 2009 WL 4479246 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 
2009) (stating that R.I. Supreme Court continued to cite Conley standard after Twombly/Iqbal).  
137  See, e.g., Bean v. Cummings, 939 A.2d 676, 680 (Me. 2008) (stating that federal guidance is used for 
motions to dismiss, but Twombly was inapplicable to this case); Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 
619, 631 (Minn. 2007) (finding that Twombly was fact-specific and not applicable); Holleman v. Aiken, 668 
S.E.2d 579 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting standard until the state Supreme Court addressed the issue); 
138  Compare Déjà vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, No. M2008-
01393-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3270195 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2009) (using Twombly as additional 
support) with Morris v. Grusin, No. W2009-00033-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4931324 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 
22, 2009) (refusing to adopt Twombly/Iqbal because Tenn. Supreme Court hadn’t changed the 
standard).Crum v. Johns Manville, Inc., 19 So. 3d 208 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (rejecting standard until the 
Alabama Supreme Court chooses to follow it) Holleman v. Aiken, 668 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) 
(rejecting standard until the N.C. Supreme Court addressed the issue); Siemans Fin. Servs. V. McCurry v. 
Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 193 P.3d 155, 157 (Wash Ct. App. 2008) (stating that absent guidance from 
the Wash. Supreme Court, it would not adopt Twombly) 
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formula.139  The South Dakota Supreme Court adopted Twombly in a case where 
plaintiff alleged federal § 1983 and 1985 claims as well as state statutory claims140   
III. STATE EFFORTS TO PIERCE THE VEIL OF PRETRIAL SECRECY  
 I begin this section with some personal reminiscence.  When I began practice in the 
1970’s almost all discovery requests and responses, including depositions, were filed in 
the Clerk’s Office.141  There were no explicit limitations on discovery, although often 
negotiations pared down or eliminated some of what was requested.  Protective orders 
were sometimes requested from the court to seal some information, disclosed during 
discovery because of trade secrets, medical or other personal information and other 
materials deemed worthy of protection under the standards set out by Rule 26(c) and its 
state analogues.142  Rarely did I encounter a request for an agreed upon protective 
order, blanket or otherwise.  Most litigation moved toward a negotiated settlement, a 
disposition by dispositive motion, or a trial in a slow but steady pace.  No cases were 
sent to mediation, arbitration, or other third party resolution machinery.  Trials, while not 
resolving the majority of cases, were not rare.  Settlements were typically filed in court 
and open to public scrutiny. 
 Today, this scenario is largely an historical artifact.  Discovery is almost never filed in 
court.  Demands, typically by defendants, for agreed-upon protective orders for 
information exchanged pretrial are common.  Trials are held in only a small percentage 
of the caseload and almost no negotiated settlements are open to the public, either 
                                            
139  Iannacchino v Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.3d 879, 890 (Mass. 2008). 
140  Sisney v. Best, Inc., 754 N.W.2d 804, 808 (S.D. 2008). 
141  FED. R. CIV. P. 5.  Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other Papers.  (a) Service:  “ . . . every paper 
relating to discovery . . . shall be served upon each of the parties.  (d) Filing.  All papers after the 
complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a 
reasonable time thereafter.  Id. 
142  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (“[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person 
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .”). 
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because they are not filed in court or are filed under seal. 
 These changes produce critical differences in the way law is practiced by lawyers 
and experienced by the parties and the public.  In particular, much of the information 
about cases that was formerly available to third parties—litigants in similar cases, 
potential claimants, or the media—is now hidden from view.  Transparency of the 
operations of courts is threatened by numerous factors.  Civil trials are presumptively 
open to the public and the press143 but only a minute number of the cases now go to 
trial.144  While the public has a well-established right to inspect and copy court 
records,145 information gathered in discovery is not now filed in court unless used in a 
trial or a hearing.146  Parties, typically at defendant’s insistence, often stipulate that 
discovery information will not be filed or will be filed under seal, will be destroyed or 
returned at the conclusion of the case and will not be revealed to third parties.147  Since 
the majority of cases are resolved by negotiated settlement, typically with a 
                                            
143  Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980) (“historically both civil and 
criminal trials have been presumptively open.”). 
144  For example, in 2004, in New Jersey, completed trials comprised only 1.9% of all completed civil 
dispositions.  National Center for State Courts, Examining the Work of State Courts 12 (2005), available 
at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2005_files/4-EWCivil_final_1.pdf.  In Arizona, the number 
of completed civil cases disposed of via trial in 2001 was 5%.  Rosalind R. Greene & Jan Mills Spaeth, 
The Vanishing Jury Trial Phenomenon & Trial Preparation, 46 Ariz. Att'y 22, 22 (Apr. 2010).  By 2008, this 
number had dropped to 1%.  Id.  Professor Marc Galanter first reported this trend in 2004 when his 
research revealed that despite civil dispositions in the federal district courts having increased by a factor 
of five between 1962 and 2002, the number of trials had dropped by 20%.  Marc Galanter, The Vanishing 
Trial: An Examination of the Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 459–61, 479–81, 507  In 1972, 36.1% of state court cases were disposed of by trial; the average 
time from filing to trial was 16 months. 
145  Nixon v. Warner Commun. Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). 
146  See, e.g., F.R.C.P. 5(d) as amended in 2000.  KAN. R. CIV. P. 60-205(d)(1) (“Interrogatories, 
depositions . . . discovery requests or responses . . .  shall not be filed except on order of the court or until 
used in a trial or hearing, at which time the documents shall be filed.”); ME. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1) (“Unless 
otherwise ordered by the court, or necessary for use in the proceeding, notices, written questions and 
transcripts of depositions prepared in accordance with Rule 5(f), interrogatories, requests pursuant to 
Rules 34 and 36,and answers, objections and responses thereto shall be served upon other parties but 
shall not be filed with the court.”). 
147  See, N.J. FORMS OF CIV P. C. L. 1 6.625.04 (providing samples of language for agreed upon protective 
orders.) 
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confidentiality clause, little is known about the disposition of many cases.148 
 In addition, increasingly numerous alternate dispute resolution (ADR) processes—
e.g., court ordered or privately contracted mediation and/or arbitration—operate 
completely outside public view or knowledge.149  Third parties will rarely learn of the 
information gathered in these proceedings, the result, or whether an issue was ever 
disputed.  Contractually enforced ADR, thus can hide patterns of abuse by a corporation 
or by an entire industry.150  These processes and current court practices consequently 
rob the community of a crucial function of the dispute resolution system.  They shield 
from public view deep issues of community interest and evidence of misconduct..151   
 O.W. Holmes famously noted "the prophesies of what the courts will do in fact, and 
                                            
148  One insurance defense attorney noted he had not “put a settlement together in the past five to six 
years that [lacked] a confidentiality clause . . . .”  Blanca Fromm, Comment: Bringing Settlement Out of 
the Shadows: Information About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 676 (2001) 
(quoting California lawyer Glenn Gilsleider).  Walter V. Robinson, Scores of Priests Involved in Sex Abuse 
Cases; Settlements Kept Scope of Issue Out of Public Eye, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2002, at A1 (reporting 
that the Archdiocese of Boston had "quietly settled child molestation claims against at least 70 priests" 
within the past ten years). 
“[A] troubling tendency accompanies the increasing frequency and scope of confidentiality 
agreements that are ordered by the court. These agreements are reached by private parties and 
often involve materials and information that is never even presented to the court . . . Once signed, 
a confidentiality order, which has converted a private agreement into an order of the court, 
requires the court to use its contempt power to enforce the private agreement....” 
In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litigation, 255 F.R.D. 308, 322 (D. Conn. 
2009) (quoting City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
149  In the last decade, the use of mandatory ADR has increased rapidly.  STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK 
E.A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROBERS & SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, 
AND OTHER PROCESSES 402 (5th ed., 2007).  Though the Uniform Mediation Act does not impose general 
confidentiality obligations through the statute, other statutes may obligate a mediator to keep information 
in a mediation confidential.  Id. at 460. 
150  See Corporate Responsibility: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign 
Commerce and Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 108th Cong. 19 
(2002) (statement of Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen, testifying that financial companies were 
forcing consumers to arbitrate claims of securities fraud, hiding widespread abuse by the industry).  See 
generally Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009:  Hearing on H.R. 1508 Before the Subcomm. on Comm. And 
Admin. Law, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-
40_50069.PDF (discussing Sunshine in Litigation Acts); Joseph F. Anderson, Hidden from the Public by 
Order of the Court:  The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, available at 
http://www.law.com/pdf/nlj/011204secrets-article.pdf (discussing the Sunshine in Litigation Bill and the 
dangers that overutilization of confidentiality orders create for the public and legal system generally). 
151  See generally Owen M. Fiss, Comment: Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
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nothing more pretentious, is what I mean by the law."152  Current practices rob the 
community of law itself and of the process by which courts help reform our society.  
They emasculate deterrence and prevent accurate evaluation of the worth of cases.  
Many lawsuits are not merely private disputes but matters of public concern. 
"[L]itigants serve as nerve endings registering the aches and pains of the 
body politic, which the courts attempt to treat by refining the law.  Using 
litigants as stimuli for refining the law is a legitimate public interest in the 
literal sense of the term: the public is interested in learning the practical 
implications of past political choices and the values they embody.  The law 
is a self-portrait of our politics, and adjudication is at once the 
interpretation and the refinement of the portrait."153  
 
Lack of access to information gathered pretrial creates a serious structural problem for 
the functioning of this unique feature of the American judicial system.  Secrecy often 
thwarts efforts to avoid unnecessary risks to the public.   
 The list of examples is long and tragic.  Beginning in 1933 information in, and the 
results of, lawsuits against Johns Manville Company for damages from asbestos were 
sealed.154  Asbestos continued to be used in many products.  Five decades later federal 
scientists published data showing asbestos caused more cancer than any other 
workplace product.155  There are numerous additional instances of harm.  Leslie Bailey 
an attorney with the Public Justice, succinctly described the dangers associated with 
court secrecy in Congressional testimony: 
Famous examples about of damaging information revealed in litigation but 
                                            
152  O.W. Holmes, Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460–61(1897).  Holmes' colleague from 
Harvard, John Chipman Gray, reiterated: "the law of the state…is composed of the rules which the courts, 
that is the judicial organs of that body, lay down for the determination of legal rights and duties."  J.C. 
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW, 84 (2d ed. 1921). 
153  David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2637 (1995). 
154  PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 114 (1985). 
155  See Kenneth Bridbord, Pierre Decoufle, Joseph F. Fraumeni, Jr., David G. Hoel, Robert N. Hoover, 
David P. Rall, Umberto Saffiotti, Marvin A. Schneiderman & Arthur C. Upton, Estimates of the Fraction of 
Cancer in the United States Related to Occupational Factors, in BANBURY REPORT 9: QUANTIFICATION OF 
OCCUPATIONAL CANCER, APP. (Richard Peto & Marvin Schneiderman eds., 1981) 
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kept secret from the public for long periods of time:  Bic lighters, car seats, 
breast implants, and all-terrain vehicles were all subject to protective orders 
while countless consumers continued to be at risk from using 
them . . . .Manufacturers of dangerous drugs settled cases brought by injured 
patients on terms that forbade the patients’ attorneys from notifying the FDA 
that the drug caused harm.156 
 
The risks are not confined to individuals; public health concerns are likewise implicated. 
Civil litigation uncovers a great deal of otherwise unavailable information 
about practices and products which may cause disease and injury.  However, 
common practices in and related to lawsuits, trials, and courts, such as 
protective orders, sealing orders, and confidential settlements, can deprive 
health authorities and the public itself of information that might be helpful to 
prevent disease, injury, disability, and death.157 
 
 Nor are judgments of courts immune from this disease.  In 2006, a Florida 
newspaper revealed that since 2001 courts in several counties had maintained secret 
dockets of nearly two hundred cases including negligence, malpractice and fraud.158  
Similar occurrences are reported in other venues.159   
 The secrecy created by parties’ agreements, often at the insistence of defendants 
who dangle financial incentives to plaintiffs, and closed court processes cause damage 
to individuals and to the system as a whole.  How many deaths and injuries might have 
been prevented but for protective orders and confidential settlements shielding 
information about tire safety defects which caused tread to peel off and Ford Explorers 
                                            
156  Hearings, supra note _, at 3–4 (written statement of Leslie A. Bailey). 
157  Daniel J. Givelber & Anthony Robbins, Public Health Versus Court-Sponsored Secrecy, 69 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 131 (2006). 
158  Patrick Daumer & Dan Christensen, Court Cases Hidden From Public, MIAMI HERALD (Apr 16, 2001 at 
A1). 
159  In Connecticut, for example, investigations by the Hartford Courant and the Connecticut Law Tribune 
in late 2002 revealed that Connecticut courts had sealed files of about 7,000 cases and designated 
another forty or more cases as so “super-secret” that court clerks were instructed to deny their existence.  
See CONN. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE COURTS 12–13 (2004) 
[hereinafter CBA REPORT]; see also Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d 83, 86–87 (detailing how Connecticut 
courts had been routinely sealing scores of entire case files and docket sheets without providing any 
justification). 
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to roll over?160  Can administrative agencies, assuming their will to enforce statutory 
standards, perform adequately under these opaque conditions?  Can consumers act 
rationally in this environment? 
 There are many legitimate reasons, e.g., trade secrets or highly personal 
information, to restrict access to information gathered in litigation and to grant protective 
orders are upon a showing of good cause.161  Commonly, however, parties create 
“Agreed Upon Protective Orders” sealing discovery.162  The judicial determination of 
whether good cause actually exists never takes place.  In addition, absent a protective 
order, a party has the right to disseminate information obtained during discovery for 
lawful purposes.163  This right is also bought and sold 
 In recent decades, federal and state rules eliminated the requirement of filing 
                                            
160  Eventually, 14.4 million tires were recalled in 2000.  Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae Public 
Citizen in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Opposition to Protective Order, Trahan v. Ford 
Motor Co., No. 99-62989 (61st Dist. of Harris County, Tex. Sept. 18, 2000), available at 
http://citizen.org.litigation/briefs/OpenCourt/articles.cfm?ID=1070. 
161  Id. 26(c). Rule 26(c) identifies eight kinds of protective orders that a district court might issue, but the 
list is nonexclusive and courts have wide discretion to order other appropriate discovery restriction.  Such 
an order is appropriate where “justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”  See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & 
Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2036 (2d ed., 1997) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)); 
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (noting that “trial court is in the best position to 
weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery”).  See generally Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement 
(In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2684 (1995) (addressing privacy issues in settlement of cases). 
 The states have comparable provisions to the federal rule.  For example, OHIO R. CIV. P. 26(c) 
provides the eight types of protective orders that may issue from the court, but also requires that before 
the order is sought, the parties must attempt to resolve the issue among themselves, and certify as such 
to the court before requesting the protective order.  OHIO CIV. R. 26(c).  See also MASS. R. CIV. P. 26(c); 
IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.504 (providing that the court has the discretion to issue a protective order in eight 
situations). 
162  See NJ FORMS OF CIV. P. CLI 6.625.04 (providing a sample of language used in agreed upon 
protective orders). 
163  See, e.g., Exum v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 209 F.R.D. 201, 205 (D. Colo. 2002) (“Parties to litigation 
have a First Amendment right to disseminate information they obtained in discovery absent a valid 
protective order.”); Federal Trade Comm’n v. Digital Interactive Assocs., Inc., No. 95-Z-754, 1996 WL 
912156, *2 (D. Colo. 1996) (emphasizing that in ruling on motion for a protective order, court “begins with 
the premise that a party to litigation has a Constitutionally protected right to disclose the fruits of discovery 
to non parties absent a valid protective order entered by a court”). 
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discovery information.164  Since the amendment to FRCP 5(d) in 2000 pretrial 
information is typically unavailable.  Federal courts are surprisingly hostile to third party 
access to this information.  For example, the Second Circuit established a “general and 
strong presumption against access to documents sealed under protective order when 
there was reasonable reliance upon such an order.”165 The court reached this 
conclusion, despite the fact that the protective order in this case was a privately agreed 
upon umbrella order, lacking any judicial determination of good cause.166 
 Parties, almost invariably plaintiffs, may be willing to auction public access to pretrial 
information or settlements for quicker access to discovery or monetary concessions by 
defendants.  When there is a demonstrable public interest in the information, however, 
parties should have no right to buy or sell nondisclosure.167  It is the court discovery 
rules—including protective orders—which govern the obligation to produce information. 
The law, not the parties, should govern the use of that information and who will have 
access to it. 
                                            
164  The 2000 amendment to Rule 5(d) affirmatively barred filing discovery.  FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d).  I have 
detailed the history of this and earlier changes to Rule 5 in Seymour Moskowitz, Discovering Discovery: 
Non-Party Access to Pretrial Information in the Federal Courts, 1938—2006, 78 COLO. L. REV. 817 (2007).  
State filing rules were changed with the same result.  See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 5(g), N.D. R. CIV. P. 
5(d)(i); ALA. R. CIV. P. 5(d). 
165 TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222 at 231 (2d Circ. 2001).  
166 TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222 at 225 (“Under the October 2000 Order, each party had the right to 
designate material as ‘confidential information’ if it believed in good faith that the material should be so 
classified.”). 
167  See generally Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned in Discovery 
Legal, Illegal or Something in Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783 (2002) (analyzing arguments against 
contracting for secrecy in federal litigation).  Even confidentiality duties imposed on professionals are 
abrogated under certain circumstances.  For example, communications between attorneys and their 
clients are protected, but societal interests may override these duties where public health or safety is 
involved.  See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L&R §§ 4503, 4505.  A “compelling interest in public health” takes 
precedence, for example, over the attorney-client privilege claimed by the defendant in written 
communications between counsel and firm executives.  Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 
357, 365 (E.D. N.Y. 1996), vacated, 167 F.R.D. 6 (E.D. N.Y. 1996); see generally 2 JOHN W. STRONG, 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 225 (1999). 
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A. State Anti-Secrecy Measures 
 At its October 2009 meeting, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee noted the “time 
has come to take another serious look at discovery protective orders.”168  The federal 
rulemakers might seriously consider some existing standards in state law.  Under none 
of the state sunshine statues or court rules now described are parties unable to secure 
protection of trade secrets, other proprietary information, privacy or other legitimate 
interests.  Rather the burden is appropriately placed on those who seek protective 
orders to justify these concerns.  These statutes and rules recognize that there may be 
a public interest in pretrial information or in settlements affecting health and safety. 
i.   Montana 
 The most recent state to act was Montana in 2005.  The “Gus Barber Anti-Secrecy 
Act”169 was named after a nine-year-old child killed when a Remington Model 700 rifle 
discharged while being cleaned by the child’s mother.170  The family learned later that 
Remington had been sued more than 80 times about the gun triggering mechanism.171 
Most of the lawsuits had been resolved with confidentiality orders preventing disclosure 
of the information gathered and the settlements negotiated.   Under the Montana statute 
no portion of a final order, a judgment, or a settlement agreement that “has the purpose 
or effect of concealing a public hazard” may be enforced.172  Nor may a party request, 
                                            
168  Memorandum from Honorable Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, Dec. 8, 2009, at 5. 
169  MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-112(1). 
170  “I pulled the safety off and it fired.  The gun went off.  My finger was nowhere near the trigger.  I had 
an open hand” Ms. Barber recalled.   CBS News, Richard and Barbara Barber Interview, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/02/06/eveningnews/main269786.shtml (last visited May 19, 2010). 
171  See Walt Williams, Richard Barber of Manhattan isn’t one to Step Away from a Fight, BOZEMAN 
CHRONICLE (2006). 
172  MONT. CODE. ANN. § 2-6-112 (3).  Public hazard is defined as a “device, instrument, or manufactured 
product, or a condition of a device, instrument, or manufactured product, that endangers public safety or 
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as a condition to the production of discovery, that another party stipulate to such an 
order or judgment.173 
 The goal is to outlaw the market for sale of information about public hazards.  
Procedural means to challenge secrecy are established.   “[A]ny affected person,” 
including news media, may contest a final order or judgment or settlement violating the 
Act.174  Once challenged, the court must examine the disputed information or materials 
in camera.  If it determines the information concerns a public hazard the court must 
allow disclosure. 
ii.   Florida and Other States 
 One of the oldest Sunshine in Litigation Acts was enacted in Florida in 1990. 
[N]o court shall enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect 
of concealing a public hazard or any information concerning a public 
hazard, nor shall the court enter an order or judgment which has the 
purpose or effect of concealing any information which may be useful to 
members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may 
result from the public hazard.175 
 
A “public hazard” “is an instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, 
instrument, person, procedure, product or a condition of a device, instrument . . . that 
has caused and is likely to cause injury.”176  Unlike the Montana statute, however, no 
procedure is specified for intervention to contest orders or judgments that conceal public 
hazards.  Nor does the statute provide when the determination of public hazard is to be 
made.177   These deficiencies have created enforcement difficulties, but a number of 
                                                                                                                                             
health and has caused injury.”  Id. § 2-6-112 (2).  Trade secrets, defined by state law, and information 
made confidential by law, are exempt.  Id. § 2-6-112(6). 
173  Id. § 2-6-112(5). 
174  Id. § 2-6-112(7). 
175  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(1), (3) (West 2010). 
176  Id. § 69.081(2). 
177  See Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access to 
Information Generated Through Litigation,  81 CHI. KENT L.R. 375, 424–26 (2006). 
33 
 
high profile cases have illustrated the usefulness of the Act.178 
 Other states have similar statutes.  In Louisiana, protective orders shall not be 
issued and nondisclosure provisions not be enforced in cases involving public 
hazards.179  Arkansas bans contracts or agreements entered into to settle a lawsuit 
barring the disclosure or of an environmental hazard.180  Other states have narrower 
statutes forbidding the sealing of settlement agreements where an agency of the state 
or its subdivisions is a party.181 
 State court created rules have also addressed these access issues.  Texas Rule of 
Civil Procedure 76a bans the sealing of any "court order or opinion issued in the 
adjudication of a case."182  Court records are presumed to be open to the general public 
and may only be sealed upon a showing that specific private rights outweigh “the 
presumption of openness and any probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon 
the general public health or safety.”183  Notably, Rule 76a defines court records to 
include unfiled discovery and settlement agreements.184  These provisions address the 
most common means of shielding pretrial information from the public.   
                                            
178  See, e.g., State v. American Tobacco Comp., 723 So. 2d 263 (Fla 1998); Jones v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 871 So. 2d 899 (Fla Dist. App. 2003). 
179  See LA. CODE. CIV. PROC. ANN. ART. 1426(E). 
180  “ARK. CODE ANN. “environmental hazard” means a substance or condition that may affect land, air, or 
water in a way that may cause harm to the property or person of someone other than the contracting 
parties to a lawsuit settlement contract referred to in subsection (a) of this section.” ARK. CODE ANN. 16-
55-122(b) (Westlaw current through end of 2010 Fiscal Sess., including changes made by Ark. Code Rev. 
Comm. received through 4/26/10). 
181  The North Carolina statute makes settlement agreements public records where government agencies 
official actions are at issue., as defined in G.S. 132-1, on such suits public records.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 132-1.3(a), (b) (2009). 
182  TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1). 
183  The proponent of sealing a court record also has the burden of showing no less restrictive means 
than sealing records will adequately and effectively protect the specific interest asserted.  Id. 
184  Id. (Emphasis added). 
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 Procedural mechanisms are provided for enforcement.  An open court hearing is 
required when sealing of information is challenged185 and the court must explain which 
interests are furthered by secrecy.186  The Rule also gives courts continuing jurisdiction 
over such orders and allows intervention to try to unseal the information at or before 
judgment.187 
IV. Conclusion 
 Procedure matters in litigation.  Today the pretrial process is critical to the 
disposition of most cases.  Although first year law students in civil procedure courses 
across the United States study the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in depth, once in 
practice these lawyers quickly recognize the significance of state procedure.  These 
state rules impact millions of individuals, public and private entities and society as a 
whole.  The enterprise of this essay has been to demonstrate that various states, using 
procedures distinct from the FRCP have created experiments which Federal rulemakers 
should consider in their ongoing work.  Coupled with empirical analysis of the results of 
these trials, we may produce a system both just and efficient. 
 
                                            
185  TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(3), 76a(4). 
186  Id. 
187  Id 76a(7) 
